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SURVEY

OF ILLINOIS LAW-1950-1951

VI.

PROPERTY

MEAL AND PERSONAL PROPBRTY

Without doubt, the most noteworthy development in the law
of real property is the action taken by the legislature with regard
to methods of conveyancing. By the deletion of a few words
from the Conveyances Act, the legislature has brought an end to
ancient doctrines relating to the use of private seals in the case
of such instruments as contracts, deeds, mortgages and the like.1
While the use of a private seal is not forbidden, and will probably continue to be so used by lawyers who slavishly follow older
forms or who have established almost automatic habits of dictation, seals are no longer necessary nor will the presence thereof
in any way change the construction to be given to legal instruments. It would appear, therefore, that subterfuge of the type
previously practice2 should no longer be necessary. It yet
remains to be seen, however, whether common law doctrines
relating to procedural distinctions between sealed and unsealed
contracts will follow in the train of the changes so made with
relation to deedsA
Lesser questions of real property law have been settled by/
the courts. Two oil and gas cases, for example, might be said
to possess significance. In one of them, that of United States v.
Illinois Central Railroad Company,4 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed a decision of a federal district court
which had held that the nature of the grant of public lands to the
railroad company was such as to permit it to extract oil and gas
1 Laws 1951, p. 1297, H.B. 923; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, §§ 1, 9, 10, 11
and 26. A companion measure, Laws 1951, p. 1299, H.B. 924, adds Section 153b to
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, although, in scope, it may have been intended
to have more direct bearing in relation to contracts.
2 See Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 416, S.B. 450, same as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1,
Ch. 30, § 34a, which enacted the fiction that a recital of sealing, in the body or in
the acknowledgment of any deed, resulted in the adoption of any seal appearing
thereon, including that of the notary public! The reason for this queer provision
is explained in 30 Ill. B. J. 20, at p. 21, discussing S.B. 450.
3 It has been permissible for many years, in Illinois, to disregard the seal and
to sue as in special assumpsit, even though, in the old days, an action of covenant
would have been more proper: Dean v. Walker, 107 Ill. 540 (1883).
4 187 F. (2d) 374 (1951), affirming 89 F. Supp. 17 (1949), noted in 29 CHICAGOKENT LAw REviEw 84.

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

beneath the right of way provided the process did not interfere
with fundamental railroading operations. The reviewing court
added nothing to the decision of the district judge. Aside from
insuring protection to those who have dealt with the railroad company in relation to its oil and gas producing activities, the case
merely provides a vehicle for an application of long-settled common law concepts inherent in a base fee estate. In the other,
that of Hardy v. Greathouse,5 the Illinois Supreme Court was
asked to construe the. nature of a reservation of a "one-sixteenth
of all oils and minerals produced from the premises for
fifteen years from the date of this conveyance." It indicated that
no right arose in the grantor until after severance of the product
from the realty, hence the language did not reserve an interest
in the land itsilf but more nearly created a personal property interest in the form of a royalty. The court distinguished the situation before it from the one involved in Mandle v. Gharing6
on the basis that the reservation in that case ran perpetually and
applied to all oil and gas produced, whereas the instant case
concerned a reservation limited both as to time and quantity.
Easement rights have also been considered. While the case
of Kurz v. Blume 7 cannot be said to establish any new law it does
present an opportunity to review doctrines relating to the extinguishment of an easement of right of way created by reservation in a grant. The ancestors in title to the parties currently
enjoying the ownership of the dominant and servient estates had
established the right of way but, in the intervening years, the
tenants of the dominant property had made no use thereof for
more than twenty years although the passageway had frequently
been utilized by the tenants of the servient estate. A revival
of use began when the current owner of the dominant estate
erected a garage on his own land which opened on the passageway.
A decree of the trial court quieting title in favor of the owner
of the servient estate was reversed by the Supreme Court on the
ground that a mere non-user was not enough to destroy an ease5406 111. 365, 94N. E. (2d) 134 (1950).
6 256 Pa. 121, 100 A. 535, 29 A. L. R. 593 (1917).
407 I1. 383, 95 N. E. (2d) 338 (1950).
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ment resting in grant and that the mere use of the alley by
tenants of the servient estate did not amount to an adverse possession. A claim of adverse possession for seven years under
color of title with payment of taxes, made by the owner of the
servient estate, was likewise held to be ineffective as the sevenyear period fell partly within the time covered by the revival of
the use.
The converse of that problem occurs in the case of Sottiaux
v. Bean" for there a driveway between two houses had been in
existence for over forty years, the major portion of which lay
on defendant's property. It was asserted by plaintiff, the adjoining owner, that, through the continued use of the driveway, a title
in fee simple had been acquired in that portion of the land which
actually fell within defendant's line. The complaint merely
sought an injunction to restrain defendant from interfering with
the use and damaging the pavement of the side drive but, because of the complications engendered by counterclaims and the
like, the trial court entered a decree establishing a new boundary
line between the lots. Again the evidence was confficting but did
tend to show that defendant's predecessors had, from time to
time, made some use of the driveway during the forty-year period
although not, apparently, objecting to the use made thereof by
plaintiff's predecessors. On the strength of this testimony, the
Supreme Court ruled the adverse possession, if such it was, had
not been exclusive to the degree necessary to destroy the title
but was sufficient to create an easement by prescription. It,
therefore, reversed with a direction to enter an appropriate form
of decree.
Land taken for railroad purposes customarily provides the
carrier with no more than an easement of use to the extent
needed 9 so as not to prevent the owner of the servient estate
from making use of the substrata or superincumbent airspace.1 0
It does not follow, however, that the carrier may not acquire the
8408 IMl. 25, 95 N. E. (2d) 899 (1951).
9 Il. Const. 1870, Art. 2, § 13.
10 See note in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 92 on the right to use the space over
the tracks.
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fee simple title with all of the attributes relating thereto. If the
carrier does acquire such rights, then, according to City of Chicago v. Sexton," it is entitled to recover full compensation for
the value of any part of the property condemned for public use
and is not limited to the recovery of merely nominal damages.
The city there sought to utilize a portion of the airspace over the
right of way of a railroad for viaduct purposes. Judgment was
entered on a jury verdict fixing damages at $1.00 on the theory
that the railroad, as such, would not be hampered in its use of the
right of way, hence had sustained no appreciable damage. The
Supreme Court reversed the judgment and directed the granting
of a new trial when it appeared the carrier owned the fee and had
been able to sell portions of the airspace above its tracks at substantial prices for other uses without, in any way, interfering
with its use of the surface for railroad purposes. The holding in
City of Chicago v. Lord1 2 was not followed because, since the
date of that decision, the legislature had increased the powers of
railroads in respect to their ability to sell unneeded real estate,
or different levels or parts thereof, so long as there was no
impairment of the fundamental use. 13 It is questionable, however, if the same result would be reached where the railroad had
acquired no more than an easement, so it cannot be said that the
holding in the Lord case has been entirely overruled.
Future rather than present interests in land were the topic
of consideration in certain other cases. In Hollerich v. Gronbach,'4 for example, the court held that an unlimited power of
sale given to a life tenant could not be construed to enlarge the
life estate to a fee as the life tenant there concerned had no
power to consume the property. The testator's widow, as life
tenant, had exercised the power shortly before her death and had
attempted to bequeath the proceeds to her collateral relatives to
the detriment of the rights of the remaindermen named in the
testator's will. In support of the widow's action, it was argued
11408 Ill. 351, 97 N. E. (2d) 287 (1951).
12 276 Ii. 571, 115 N. E. 397 (1917).
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 114, § 174a.
14342 Il. App.. 242, 96 N. E. (2d) 354 (1951), noted in 3 Stanford L. Rev. 731.
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that the remaindermen had only a vested interest subject to
divestment by exercise of the power of sale. But the Appellate
Court, relying upon Barton v. Barton and upon Cales v. Dressier,5
construed the life tenant's unlimited power to sell as being no
more than a mere power to change the form of the property. As
it was still possible to trace the proceeds, they passed to the
remaindermen under the testator's will and not by way of the
life tenant. In Board of National Missions v. Smith, 16 however,
the federal court construed a somewhat similar provision to the
point where it was held to provide a power of sale so broad that
the life tenant could not only change the form of the property
but could also dispose of the fee and leave no remainder.
By avoiding a strained construction of a remainder limited
to "my then living heirs at law," the Supreme Court, in Boldenweck v. City National Bank & Trust Company,1 7 also avoided
the doctrine of the worthier title, which, although without basis
in the law, still survives in Illinois.'
The testator there set
up two trusts; one for his widow, with cross-remainder to his
son, and the other for his son, with cross-remainder to his widow.
When the interests specifically set forth came to an end, the
entire balances of both trusts were to vest in the testator's "then
living heirs at law," heirship to be determined according to the
Illinois laws of descent at the time of his death. The testator's
widow survived the son. On her death, her executors, seeking
to enforce a claim against the testator's estate, sued for construction of the will. A denial of the claim by the trial court
was affirmed in the Supreme Court. It applied the general constructional rule of Way v. Geiss,19 one which declares that when
a remainder to a class follows a prior estate, determination of
membership in the class is not to be made until after the termination of the prior estate. The words "then living heirs at
15283 Il1.338, 119 N. E. 320 (1918), and 315 Ill. 142, 146 N. E. 162 (1925),
respectively.
16 182 F. (2d) 362 (1950).
17 343 Ill. App. 569, 99 N. E. (2d) 692 (1951).
18 See McNeilly v. Wylie, 389 Ill.391, 59 N. E. (2d) 811 (1945), noted in 24
CHICAGo-KENT LAW REwIEW 60.
19 280 Ill.
152, 117 N. E. 443 (1917).
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law," therefore, were held to refer to the testator's heirs at law
as determined on the date of the widow's death but to the exclusion of her. It was further argued by the appellant-executors
that the doctrine of worthier title voided the remainder and that,
as a result, the property passed to the testator's heirs at law,
determined as of the date of his death, by intestacy. The court
held that the doctrine of the worthier title could apply only to
gifts to right heirs, i. e., those determined as of the testator's
death, and that there is no rule of law to defeat the testator's
intention by preventing him from limiting a remainder to his
"heirs" where that word is used in some sense other than right
heirs.
A gift over of the corpus upon termination of a trust was

construed as vested and not contingent in Dyslin v.

Wolf.20

The

t estator gave certain property in trust for and during the lifetime
of all of his children and then provided that, upon the death of
"the survivor of my children, it is my will that the said trust
shall terminate and the said real estate go to my grandchildren,
Following the tesin equal shares, absolutely and forever."
tator's death, one of his five surviving children died, leaving two
children. One of these grandchildren also died before the termination of the trust. In a suit by this deceased grandson's
widow to construe the above clause of the testator's will, the trial
court held that the deceased grandson had a vested interest in the
trust corpus, subject to being opened up to admit afterborn
grandchildren of the testator, and that the corpus passed to the
grandson's devisee and widow, under the grandson's will. The
deceased grandson's brother, as appellant, argued that the gift of
the corpus to the grandchildren was contingent upon survival
until the termination of the trust, applying a rule of construction
that a gift postponed until the future because of the tender age
of the beneficiaries is primarily for the benefit of such future
beneficiaries and, therefore, contingent upon their survival to the
20407 Il1. 532, 96 N. E. (2d) 485 (1950). The court first construed a gift of trust
income, holding that, under the terms of the will as construed, where children dying
before the termination of the trust left children surviving them, such grandchildren
took interests which were vested and descendible, and neither terminated on their
deaths nor subject to implied cross-remainders.
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period set for distribution. No sufficient words of postponement
were found, however. Instead, the court adverted to the constructional rule that, in such a case, where distribution is postponed solely for the purpose of letting in a life estate, the class
members then have a vested remainder.21
22
Inconsistent clauses were construed in Carrico v. Barker.
The testator there gave the residue of his property to his wife
"as her own property absolutely," but provided, in a later clause
in the will, that any "property left after the death of my wife
to be dided [sic] equally, share and share alike between
my children."
Noting that the later clause commenced with
the precatory instruction "It is my hope," and that the language
there used did not contain dispositive words of clarity similar to
the language used in the first clause, the court held that the later
clause was insufficient to reduce the fee to a life estate.2 8 The
fact that the later clause had been added to the typewritten sheet
in the testator's handwriting was not regarded as being so forceful an expression of the testator's intent as to overcome this
construction against precatory limitation on an absolute interest.

Another case required construction of the phrase "die leaving no issue." The testator gave real property to his son for life,
then to his children in fee simple, and further provided that if
any of his children should "die leaving no issue" the property
was to vest in the plaintiffs. The son died, his issue having predeceased him. In a suit by the plaintiffs against the wife for
partition, the court, in Trabue v. Gillham,24 held that the words
"die leaving no issue" meant "die without issue surviving the
life tenant," and not "die without ever having had issue," as the
widow contended. Distinguishing a contrary result in a case
where the phrase "die without issue" had been involved, 25 the
21 Fay v. Fay, 336 Ill. 299, 168 N. E. 359 (1929).

22408 Ill. 182, 96 N. E. (2d) 544 (1951).
23 In Edgar County Children's Home v. Beltranena, 402 Ill. 385, 84 N. E. (2d) 363
(1949), the court held that use of similarly equivocal language was a basis for an
inference that the testator merely intended to express a wish, and not to reduce a
fee to a life estate.
24408 Ill. 508, 97 N. E. (2d) 341 (1951).
25 Tolley v. Wilson, 371 Ill. 124, 20 N. E. (2d) 68 (1939).
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court based its opinion on the word "leaving," and upon the
testator's dominant plan to limit the property to his own descendants.
One rule of construction which had been established in some
jurisdictions but had not previously been utilized here was ap26
plied, for the first time, in the case of McGlothlin v. McElvain.
The court held that, where an executory limitation fails because
occurrence of the contingency has become impossible, then the
prior conditional limitation becomes an absolute fee. In this case,
the testator gave real property to his daughter by will. A subsequent clause provided that, in the event of the death of any
children without issue surviving, their portions were to be
distributed share and share alike among the children surviving.
As last surviving child of all of the testator's children, the
daughter died without issue. Since the clause creating the executory limitation made no provision for this possibility, construction became necessary. The testator's heirs at law contended that
the daughter had only a determinable fee, and that on her death
without issue, failure of the executory limitation resulted in a
reverter to the heirs at law of the testator. The circuit court
upheld this contention but the Supreme Court reversed. Relying on the New Jersey case of Drummond's Executor v. Drum28
mond,27 and on analogies to and dictum in Post v. Rohrbach
and in Quinlan v. Wickman,29 the upper court held that the
daughter's fee was not subject to the requirement that lawful
issue survive, but rather, that on failure of the executory devise,
her fee became absolute, just as in the case of an executory devise
void for remoteness.
Another new case, that of Storkan v. Ziska,30 held that a
determinable fee, subject to an executory bequest, was created
26407 Ill. 142, 95 N. E. (2d) 68 (1950), noted in 39 Ill. B. J. 388 (1951).
27 26 N. J. Eq. 234 (1875).
28 142 Ill. 600, 32 N. E. 687 (1892).
29 233 Ill. 39, 84 N. E. 38 (1908).
30406 I1. 259, 94 N. E. (2d) 185 (1950), noted in 31 B. U. L. Rev. 113.

SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1950-1951

in personal property. Under an inter vivos trust agreement, the
settlor had conveyed certain stock to a trustee in trust to pay
income to the settlor for life, and then to his five children equally,
giving the trustee power to sell with the consent of the children.
He further provided that if the stock had not been sold within
twenty-one years after his death, then the trust was to terminate
and the corpus was to be divided among the children. He further provided that, in case of the death of any of said children,
"then such shares coming to such deceased child or children shall
descend to the heirs of such deceased child or children."
One
child, a daughter, died but was survived by her two sons and
her brothers. By her will she gave all of her property to one son
and to her three brothers in equal shares. The trustee sued for
construction and, upon appeal taken to the Supreme Court, it
was held that future interest concepts such as those concerning
base or determinable fees and executory interests were applicable
to personalty as well as to realty. Relying chiefly upon Defrees
v. Brydon,31 which had involved both real and personal property,
the court held in the instant case, where only personalty was concerned, that the daughter had been given a determinable fee in the
stock subject to an executory bequest to her children in the event
that she died before termination of the trust.
Rights arising under contracts for the sale of land continue
to draw attention from the courts. The issue in Handzel v.
Bassi32 was one as to whether or not a vendee had forfeited his
interest in the contract because he had, in seeming violation of
a covenant against assignment, made a subsidiary contract to
resell the premises to a third person. The court held the covenant against assignment was merely collateral to the main purpose of the contract 33 and refused to declare a forfeiture, particularly since the vendee had tendered full performance to the
31275 Ill. 530, 114 N. E. 336 (1916).

32343 Ill. App. 281, 99 N. E. (2d) 23 (1951).
33 The court cited Johnson v. Eklund, 72 Minn. 195, 75 N. W. 14 (1898), and Grigg
v. L'lndia, 21 N. J. Eq. 494 (1870).
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vendora 4 In Favata v. Mercer,3 5 it was held proper to deny
specific performance to a vendee who, through the use of an alias,
had concealed his true identity at the time of making the contract
and who really wanted the property in order to harass a business
competitor who rented the premises. While the deception was
said not to be sufficient to constitute actionable fraud, the court
regarded the buyer's conduct as being sufficiently inequitable to
justify a denial of specific performance.3 6 A defaulting purchaser, on the other hand, according to Tucker v. Beam,37 may
not recover payments made on account of the purchase price in
the absence of a clear mutual rescission of the contract.
Several aspects of the law relating to specific performance
were also considered. In Schmalzer v. Jamnik,38 it was held
proper to supply the legal description, so as to make the contract
complete, because the memorandum contained a reservation of
the right to insert the description at a later time. The case was
aided by the fact that the premises were rather fully described
from the standpoint of the nature of the improvements thereon
as well as referred to by street address. 39 In addition, there was
an admission by the seller, in a sworn answer to the complaint,
that the property so described was the property referred to in
the contract. The case of Classen v. Ripley 40 also illustrates the
length to which a court might go in translating the language of
34 On the issue of tender, it appeared that the buyer had the burden of paying the
price over a protracted period, with interest, but could, after paying one-half of the
total, obtain a deed and give back a purchase money mortgage to run for the balance
of the contract term. The complaint alleged an offer by the vendee to execute such
a mortgage but also stated that the vendee "had a commitment and had borrowed
sufficient money to pay the price in full," if the vendor would accept the same. The
court made no mention as to the validity of the last described form of tender.
35 409 Ill. 271, 99 N. E. (2d) 116 (1951).
36 The court also found that the buyer had no right to demand a warranty deed
in the absence of specific agreement to that effect, as a quit-claim deed would be
sufficient to pass title: Morris v. Goldthorp, 370 Ill. 186, 60 N. E. (2d) 857 (1945).
37 343 Ill. App. 290, 98 N. E. (2d) 871 (1951). A more extended discussion thereof
appears above under the heading of Quasi-Contracts, particularly notes 40-2 thereof.
38407 Ill. 236, 95 N. E. (2d) 347 (1950).
39 Although a street address was given, there was no mention of the city. On that
point, see Regan v. Berent, 392 Ill. 376, 64 N. E. (2d) 483 (1946).
40343 Il1. App. 298, 98 N. E. (2d) 868 (1951). The Supreme Court, in 407 Ill. 350,
95 N. E. (2d) 454 (1950), had transferred the case on the' ground that no issue
relating to a freehold was involved in an appeal froni an' order denying a motion
to vacate a decree dismissing the suit for want of equity.
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laymen into a sufficiently adequate legal description. On the
other hand, representations by the sellers' agent concerning the
physical characteristics of the land, although not specially author41
ized by the sellers,were held sufficient, in Handelman v. Arquilla,'
to defeat a suit by vendors seeking specific -performance when it
appeared that the physical characteristics were not as represented. Furthermore, the rule of Moore v. Gariglietti,42 one relating to the right of a purchaser to compel performance with
a suitable abatement in price where the seller has some title
but not all the title he contracted to sell, was held inapplicable to
the situation presented in Madia v. Collins.43 It appeared therein
that a prospective purchaser, knowing that one-half the title was
held in the names of individuals and one-half in trust, submitted
what was essentially a purchase offer for the whole tract. That
offer was accepted, in writing, by the individual owners but was
rejected by the trustee. After first attempting to secure specific
performance over the whole property, the purported purchaser
then switched to the theory of specific performance with abatement as to the undivided one-half held by the individuals who
had signed. The court affirmed a decree dismissing the suit on
the theory that no contract whatever had arisen between the
parties, making it unnecessary to reach the issue regarding
abatement of the price.
Two other cases dealing with aspects of conveyancing law are
deserving of attention. A relatively rare problem relating to the
rights of a bona fide purchaser from an heir at law, as against
a devisee under a subsequently discovered and probated will, was
discussed in the case of Eckland v. Jankowski.4 4 It appeared, in
that case, that administration proceedings had been regularly
conducted and completed on the basis that the former land owner
had died intestate. Shortly thereafter, the person who was heir
at law conveyed the premises to a purchaser who duly recorded
41407 111. 552,
42228 I1. 143,
43 408 I1. 358,
44 407 Ill. 263,
265.

95 N. E. (2d) 910 (1951).
81 N. E. 826 (1907).
97 N. E. (2d) 313 (1951).
95 N. E. (2d) 342 (1950), noted in 29 CrHICAGo-KENT
t
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his deed. Some six months later, a valid will was discovered,
and probated in favor of the plaintiff, who then, under the doctrine of relation back, 45 laid claim to the property. The court
affirmed a decree dismissing the suit of the devisee on the ground
the purchaser had a right, at the time of purchase, to rely on
the devolution of title as shown by the state of the public record.
A person relying for his title on a deed signed by a minor may
46
find comfort in the decision in the case of Shepherd v. Shepherd.
That case, one involving the right of a minor to rescind a deed
given during minority, is even the more remarkable because of
the limited amount of time which elapsed between the time
when the minor attained his majority and the beginning of the
suit, in addition to the inadequacy of the acts which the court
said were sufficient to amount to a ratification.
Issues relating to joint tenancies also came up for consideration. A decision in a rare case, that of Welsh v. James, 47 has
placed Illinois. in -what might be considered a minority position
with respect to the question of the effect, on a joint tenancy
of real estate, of the act of one joint tenant in causing the death
of the other joint tenant. The, Illinois Supreme Court there
held that the survivor did not hold the property on some form
of trust for the benefit of the heirs of the slain person but, by
reason of the inherent nature of joint tenancies and because of
a constitutional prohibition against the forfeiture of an estate,4
was entitled to enjoy the whole estate as he had, in fact, been
entitled to do from the moment of its creation.4 9 By refusing to
g'rant leave to appeal in the case of David v. Ridgely-Farmers
Safe Deposit Company,50 the Supreme Court has evidenced the
45 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 205, recognizes that doctrine.
46 408 Ill. 364, 97 N. E. (2d) 273 (1951), noted in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
361.

47408 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. (2d) 872 (1951), noted in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
260.
48 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. 2, § 11.

49 On somewhat similar reasoning, the Supreme Court, in Jackson v. Lacey, 408
Ill. 530, 97 N. E. (2d) 839 (1951), held that a joint tenancy had not been destroyed,
despite levy and sale of the interest of one joint tenant, inasmuch as the period of
redemption from the sale had not expired when the operable death occurred and no
valid deed had been issued to destroy all of the unities relating to a joint tenancy.
50 342 i1. App. 96, 95 N. E. (2d) 725 (1950). Leave to appeal has been denied.

SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1950-1951

fact that it has no desire to reopen the question it decided in the
case of In re Wilson's Estate,51 one relating to joint tenancy
ownership of the contents of safe deposit boxes where the sole
evidence of the joint relationship is to be found, if at all, in the
52
terms of the lease with the proprietor of the safe deposit vault.
The suggestion that the legislature ought to re-examine the
question has not borne fruit, but it did tinker with the statute
slightly by adding another clause covering the transfer of shares
of stock, or evidence of interest, in any corporation or the like
which have been registered in the names of two or more persons. 53
The amendment does not purport to suggest a new way of creating joint tenancies but merely purports to exonerate the corporation or entity whose transfer agent, pursuant thereto, permits a transfer of the shares by the survivor. The amendment
is a companion piece to an earlier amendment relating to the payment of dividends and the like, except that it was limited to corporations authorized to do business in this state. 54 There is,
therefore, still reason to believe that the legislature ought to
adopt a comprehensive statute on the subject. 55
LANDLORD

AND TENANT

Options under leases permitting the lessee to purchase the
demised premises are not at all uncommon but, like all options,
they must be exercised with a degree of care and pursuant to
their terms, without either qualification or attempt to impose
additional obligations on the lessor. It became necessary, in
Gaskins v. Walz,56 for the court to consider whether the lessee,
purporting to exercise an option to purchase shortly before the
expiration of his lease, had in fact demanded more than he was
entitled to have by requesting the lessor to deliver an abstract
51 404 Ill. 207, 8 N. E. (2d) 662 (1949), noted in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
258-64, 38 Ill. B. J. 228, 45 Ill. L. Rev. 285.
52 A discussion of the full issues involved in that situation appears in Kahn,
"Joint Tenancies in Safe Deposit Boxes," 39 Il1. B. J. 493.
53 Laws 1951, p. 1740, H.B. 1177; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 76, § 2(b).
54 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 840; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 76, § 2(c).
55 See, in that regard, the veto message of Governor Stevenson in relation to H.B.
687, noted in 40 Ill. B. J. 110.
56409 I1.

40, 97 N. E. (2d)

798 (1951).
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of title showing merchantable title in the lessor to date of the
exercise of the option. The lessor, who had made a forwardlooking lease of the premises to another, resisted specific performance on the ground that the lessee had failed correctly to
exercise the option by the addition of that request. The court
found otherwise when it noted, unlike the situation presented in
Morris v. Goldthorp,57 that the first sentence of the notice of
exercise of the option was complete and unqualified and mention
of an abstract of title was not made until further down in the
instrument. It did not, therefore, find it necessary to decide
whether the lessor was obligated to furnish evidence of his title,58
but ordered the lessor to convey.
Most of the disputed questions relating to the law of landlord and tenant grew up out of suits to regain possession. The
right of a landlord, after termination of a lease for non-payment
of rent and rendition of a judgment in his favor for possession of
the premises, to retain additions and improvements made by the
tenant, for example, was the topic of concern in the case of
5 9 The tenant
Getzendaner v. Erbstein.
there concerned, pursuant
to the lease, had made improvements in the nature of tenant's
fixtures but had defaulted in the payment of rent and had been
served with a writ of restitution. When the tenant thereafter
attempted to remove the fixtures and was prevented from so
doing by the landlord, the tenant sued as for a conversion. A
motion to strike the complaint was sustained by the trial court but
a majority of the Appellate Court for the First District reversed
on the basis that, whatever the rule might be as to delay in
removal after the term had expired by a normal lapse of time, 0°
the tenant's right of removal continued for at least a reasonable
time after judgment for possession following an unusual termination of the lease, even though produced by the tenant's
fault.
57390 Ill. 186, 60 N. E. (2d) 857 (1945).

58 On that point, see Turn Verein Eiche v. Kionka, 255 Ill. 392, 99 N. E. 684
(1912).
59341 Ill. App. 594, 94 N. E. (2d) 746 (1950), noted in 29 CHIoAGo-KENT LAW
REviEw 185. Niemeyer, P. J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
6o O'Connell v. Fay, 186 Ii1. App. 113 (1914).
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Taking judicial notice of the shortage of residential quarters
in many parts of the state, the Appellate Court for the First District, in Parradee v. Blinski,6 1 a case arising prior to the 1949
amendment to the Forcible Detainer Act, 6 2 refused to permit
the tenant to have the benefit of a stay order entered after judgment for possession had been granted except on the basis that he
continue to pay the rent which had been reserved under the prior,
now terminated, lease. A claim that the landlord, by accepting
rent after judgment and during the interim stay of writ of restitution, had entered into a new lease was there declared to be a
claim made in bad faith and one which, if tolerated, would make it
impossible for trial courts "to continue the humane practice of
allowing tenants a reasonable opportunity to procure new"
habitations. 63 The amended statute, of course, would seem to
cover the situation, at least in cases of an appeal by the landlord.
An acceptance of rent accruing subsequent to a known cause for
forfeiture, however, under the holding in Garbaczewski v.
Vanucci,6 4 would operate to nullify a claim for possession.
Self-help in regaining the possession of leased premises may
not be objectionable if accomplished by the landlord in a peaceful fashion but, according to Masters v. Smythe,65 the landlord will
not be permitted to achieve that end by cutting off essential services to the demised premises, even though not specifically required
by the lease, provided the same had been furnished at and prior
to the making of the lease. The case is one which appears to have
dealt equitably with the rights of a lessor and a lessee who had
formerly been husband and wife and who, in settlement of their
property rights at the time of the divorce between them, had
agreed to a division of possession of their beneficially owned
improved land on a landlord-tenant basis. The "landlord,"
claiming a breach of a covenant against possession by any one
61342 Ill. App. 292, 96 N. E. (2d) 579 (1951).
62 Ii. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 22.
63 The court also noted that the practice of granting a stay order of several
months duration was common to the Municipal Court of Chicago. There would seem
to be no legal basis for a stay order of more than five days, as Laws 1925, p. 411,
was written to expire July 1, 1927, and was not revived.
64 342 Ill. App. 367, 96 N. E. (2d) 653 (1950).
65 342 Ill. App. 1S5, 95 N. E. (2d) 719 (1950).
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other than the "lessee," had shut off electric service on learning
that his ex-wife had remarried and was occupying the demised
property with her new husband. As he was said to have acted
unlawfully in interfering with the electric service, the "lessor"
was denied rights under the lease upon partition of the property
at the suit of the "lessee" part-owner.
Only one case dealt with the nature of the obligation to pay
rent. A total condemnation of the demised premises under the
power of eminent domain necessarily disturbs the tenant's right
to remain in possession of the property and, if ousted thereby,
relieves him of the obligation to pay rent 6 The case of Lipschultz v. Robertson, 67 decided by the Supreme Court on certificate of importance, would indicate that, once a lease has been
destroyed by acts done pursuant to an exercise of the power to
condemn, the former landlord is in no position to compel the
tenant to remain in possession and to abide by the covenants of the lease even though such landlord may, by virtue
of a lease from the condemning authority, still be able to insure
the tenant of a continuing right to possession for a further period
of time. A judgment for rent according to the prime lease in
effect between the parties, covering the balance of the term after
the tenant had surrendered possession of the premises, was there
ordered set aside on the basis that the lessor had lost the right
to rent after deed had been given to the public authority and
could not, except with the tenant's consent, regain that right
merely by taking back a lease of the property until actual possession was needed to make the public improvement.
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS

Judicial attention to issues concerning the security of creditors may be seen in the holding of the Appellate Court for the
Second District in the case of Koenig v. McCarthy.6 s It appeared
there that a sewer contractor had agreed to install a municipal
66 Corrigan v. City of Chicago, 144 Ill. 537, 33 N. E. 746, 21 L. R. A. 212 (1893).
67 407 Ill. 470, 95 N. E. (2d) 357 (1950), reversing 341 Ill. App. 221, 93 N. E. (2d)
107 (1950).
68 344 Ill. App. 93, 100 N. E. (2d) 338 (1951). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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sewage system. The general contractor sub-let portions of the
job and, in particular, contracted to purchase a quantity of precast manhole rings from another to be delivered at the manufacturer's place of business, although obviously intended to be included in the finished installation. The manufacturer, in turn,
made subsidiary contracts with others but defaulted and left
money owing to them. These persons gave notice of unpaid
claims to the general contractor and sought a lien for their unpaid
balances against moneys due under the prime contract. The general contractor sought to avoid liability on the ground the acts
performed were not of the type contemplated by the Illinois
Lien Act, since they were not to be done at the site of the improvement. The court, however, refused to give such an artful
interpretation to the legislative purpose and held the claimants
to be within the meaning of Sections 21 and 23 of the Act. 69 It
then became necessary to decide whether the claimants were
entitled to enforce a lien for the full amounts due them or were
limited to the unpaid balances arising under the subcontract between the general contractor and the supplier. Lacking any
precedent on the point, the court came to the conclusion that the
recovery had to be restricted to the unpaid balance as it would,
otherwise, be equivalent to imposing a limitless liability on the
prime contractor and would penalize him for the financial follies
70
of others.
Lacking any precedent in Illinois on the subject, the federal
district court concerned with the case of Dorsey v. Reconstruction
Finance Corporation7 had to turn to the field of real estate mortgages to find a suitable analogy to settle. the question as to
whether or not a pledgee, after suit in debt on the principal contract had become barred by limitation, could realize on the collateral security for purpose of obtaining satisfaction of the
amount loaned. The court indicated, on motion for summary
judgment in a case brought to recover damages for an alleged
69 IlL Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 82, §§ 21 and 23.
70 Reliance was placed on the holding in Thurber Construction Co. v. Kemplin, 81
S. W. (2d) 103 (Tex. Civ. App., 1935).
7196 F. Supp. 31 (1951).
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wrongful handling of the collateral securities, that the Illinois
view on the subject was to the effect that whenever the debt was
barred the security contract was likewise barred, thereby depriving the pledgee of the right to seek satisfaction from the collateral. Although the court recognized that this rule would not
be the one applied to a real estate mortgagee who, upon default,
had entered into possession,72 it professed to see a distinction
in a case where the pledgee remained in possession of the collateral but did nothing to realize thereon, since the latter was
said not to be applying the rents and profits toward the extinguishment of the debt. Despite this, the court indicated that the
pledgor would gain a hollow victory at best as, in all probability,
he would be denied the right to recover the collateral until such
time as the debt had been paid or he had made tender thereof.
Legislation on the general subject now (1) permits a professional engineer or a land surveyor to claim a mechanic's lien
for the services which he might render for the land owner or
on his property; 78 (2) directs a satisfied mortgagee or a trustee
under a deed in trust by way of a mortgage to give a written
release of the mortgage, on request, in lieu of marking the same
satisfied upon the margin of the record ;74 (3) purports to validate
foreclosure proceedings based on real estate mortgages executed
during the period from 1917 to 1921, which mortgages, according
to the law then in force, 75 should have been foreclosed by sale
after the expiration of the period of redemption rather than by
the method currently in vogue ;76 and (4) exempts chattel mortgages given by public utilities, when given in conjunction with
real estate mortgages in the fashion provided by the Public
Utilities Act, 7 7 from the requirements which otherwise would
78
attach to mortgages of that character.
72 See, for example, Brown v. Bookstaver, 141 Ill. 461, 31 N. E. 17 (1892).
73 Laws 1951, p. 1358, H.B. 744; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 82, § 1.
74 Laws 1951, p. 157, H.B. 229; i1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 95, § 9.
75 Laws 1917, p. 558. The statute was repealed in 1921: Laws 1921, p. 500.
76 Laws 1951, p. 2089, S.B. 709; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 95, § 30. See also,
Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill. 140, 133 N. E. 58 (1921).
77 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 21 Ch. 111%, § 1 et seq.
78Laws 1951, p. 1146, H.B. 1003; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 95, § 1.
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TRUSTS

Every trust case starts with a query as to whether the steps
taken by the settlor were sufficient to bring a valid trust into
existence. The case of Ross v. Ross 79 provides another example
of the factual variations in which that problem might appear. It
appeared therein that the plaintiff's husband, at a time when he
was threatened by bankruptcy proceedings, conveyed a tract of
real estate to his sister as trustee. Ten years later, upon his
request, she reconveyed the land to him by deed but the deed
was not placed of record. About two years thereafter, plaintiff's
husband and the sister executed a trust agreement relating to the
property, under which agreement the sister was supposed to hold
the property for the benefit of her brother, the plaintiff's husband,
for and during his life with remainder over on his death to plaintiff. The trust agreement was written on a standard printed form
but with many changes in the printed text, particularly one which
struck out the portion having reference to a subsequent acquisition of property by the trustee, and words were substituted indicating that the sister, as trustee, had previously acquired the title
to the trust property. A typewritten form of acknowledgment
similar to that used in a deed, including a release and waiver of
homestead, was executed by all the parties before a notary public.
On the death of the plaintiff's husband, plaintiff demanded a
conveyance of the legal title to the property from the sister who
refused on the ground that, by her earlier deed, she had effectively
reconveyed the property to her brother, despite his failure to
record that deed, and that the trust agreement was ineffectual to
revest the title in her, for which reason, being without legal title,
she could not be a trustee.
The Supreme Court held that the earlier unrecorded deed
had effectively placed the legal title to the property in the grantee
for the deed was in statutory form, had been delivered by the
grantor, and had remained in the grantee's possession and control. On the other hand, the trust agreement, although not con79 406 I11. 598, 94 N. E. (2d) 885 (1950), noted in 39 Ill. B. J. 354.
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taining the usual words of grant, evidenced the intention of the
parties that the legal title to the property should be revested in
the sister as trustee. So far as equity was concerned, this was
sufficient, for a good title may be conveyed in equity by a writing
lacking in the necessary formalities required of deeds or, for
that matter, without any writing. The evidence also disclosed
that the sister, after the death of her brother, in a letter to the
plaintiff, had admitted that she held the title to the property.
For these reasons, she was not allowed to change her conduct
after litigation had been begun and the trust was enforced.
A constructive trust question s was raised in the case of
Ridgely v. Central Pipe Line Company,81 wherein two brothers,
George and Homer, had operated a farm as partners. Homer
advised George, one 'day, that a certain tract of land could be
bought at a favorable price. They agreed to an equal joint purchase but, at the direction of Homer, only George was named as
grantee in the deed. The land so acquired was operated in conjunction with the principal farm, with taxes and other expenses
being paid out of partnership funds and all income from the sale
of crops carried to the credit of the partnership account. Subsequent to dissolution of the partnership, George refused to convey
a one-half interest in the land to Homer. The Illinois Supreme
Court approved Homer's request to have his brother declared a
constructive trustee over an undivided one-half interest in the
property. Although a mere breach of an agreement to convey
land or to hold land for another would be insufficient to create a
constructive trust, the court indicated the situation would be
different where the agreement arose out of a fiduciary relationship and the failure to comply with the terms of the agreement
constituted a breach of trust and confidence. As the brothers had
been partners, hence in a fiduciary relationship to one another,
it was proper to raise a constructive trust for it was not neces80 Two cases dealing with aspects of the constructive trust doctrine appear elsewhere in this survey. The case of Welsh v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. (2d) 872
(1951), is noted under the heading of Real and Personal Property, particularly
note 47, ante. A discussion of the holding in Lowe Foundation v. Northern Trust
Co., 342 Ill. App. 379, 96 N. E. (2d) 831 (1951), is presented hereafter in connection
with Wills and Administration, particularly note 99, post.
81409 I1. 46, 97 N. E. (2d) 817 (1951).
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sary that the parties so standing should occupy the positions of
grantor and grantee. Equity, looking to substance rather than
to form, could grant relief against the abuse of confidence and
the particular way in which the transaction arose was immaterial.
A claim to a resulting trust was advanced, in Peters v.
Meyers,8 2 under a set of facts which disclosed that a wife had
acquired real estate with her own funds but had later voluntarily
conveyed the property, without consideration, to an intermediary
who, in turn, conveyed the premises to the wife and her husband
as joint tenants. The Supreme Court indicated that the voluntary conveyance did not give rise to a resulting trust in favor of
the wife, or her heirs, even though she had furnished the entire
consideration.
Little has been said by the courts in recent years regarding
the powers of trustees. In the case of Decatur Monument Com8 the settlor had conveyed real
pany v. New Graceland Cemetery,"
estate to trustees with the power to manage, improve, develop,
lease, sell, mortgage, convey, or make other disposition of the
premises so acquired to the end that a cemetery might be established on the same. A question arose as to whether the trustees
had the power, under these provisiofis, to engage in the incidental
business of buying and selling monuments and markers to be
placed on graves located in the cemetery. The Appellate Court
answered the question in the affirmative by simply stating that the
proposed conduct was not inconsistent with the express or im84
plied powers given to the trustees.
By the terms of the trust instrument involved in Wilson v.
Daley,15 the trustee was permitted a deduction equal to ten per
cent of the gross receipts from the trust property in each year
as compensation for its management. A question arose as to
whether the trustee would be entitled, in addition, to reimburse82 408 Iii. 253, 96 N. E. (2d) 493 (1951).

83342 Il1. App. 692, 97 N. E. (2d) 570 (1951).
84 A good discussion of charitable trusts, particularly those pertaining to the
perpetual care and beautification of cemeteries, may be found in Stubblefield v.
Peoples Bank, 406 Ill. 374, 94 N. E. (2d) 127 (1950).
85342 Ill. App. 633, 97 N. E. (2d) 596 (1951). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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ment for the expenses of automobile travel, telephone, postage,
and clerical assistance incurred in the administration of the trust.
The Appellate Court reached the conclusion that the trustee was
not so entitled as the expenses were, in no sense, extra-ordinary
but were of a kind required in the usual course of administration,
which the settlor must have contemplated would be covered by
the rather generous allowance which had been made for services.
Legislative addition has been made to the statute dealing
with powers of trustees." Under a new provision, a trustee may
cause stocks, bonds, and other trust property to be registered and
held in the name of a nominee, without mention of the trust in
any instrument or record constituting the evidence of title thereto,
unless otherwise provided by the trust instrument. s7 The trustee is declared liable for the acts of the nominee with respect to
any investment so registered, is required, at all times, to keep
records which must show the ownership of the investments by
the trustee, and must keep all stocks, bonds, and similar investments in his possession and control but separate from his individual property.
WILLS AND

ADMINISTRATION

Although fundamental doctrines relating to the law of wills
have gone unchanged, two cases calling for the construction of
testamentary language are noteworthy. In one of them, that of
Lavin v. Banks,8s the testator had bequeathed "all monies on
deposit in my name in any bank or banking institution" to his
wife. A sum of cash was found, after testator's death, in the
testator's safe deposit box. To determine whether the contents
of the box came within the description of "monies on deposit,"
three of the testator's sons, both individually and in their capacity
as executors, sued for construction. The trial court found against
the wife but the Appellate Court for the First District favored
her on the ground that an ordinary testator would not distinguish
86 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 148, § 32 et seq.
87 Laws 1951, p. 295, H.B. 609; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 148, § 36.
88406 Iil. 605, 94 N. E. (2d) 876 (1950), noted in 29 CtIrOAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
192, reversing 338 Ill. App. 612, 88 N. E. (2d) 512 (1949). The Appellate Court
holding had been criticized in 28 CHICAGo-KmT LAW REVIEW 175.
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between banks and deposit companies. The Supreme Court, on
leave to appeal, reversed the Appellate Court and approved the
trial court decision by holding that safe deposit box contents could
not be said to be "on deposit" within the meaning of the provision
in question.
s9
The other case, that of Page v. Wright, involved a construction of the testator's intention as to the incidence of certain
federal estate taxes 0° The testator had there provided that his
executor should pay all taxes levied by the proper authorities in
the course of the administration of his estate without deduction
from any of the legacies. 9 1 He gave his widow, who was a
life beneficiary as to that portion, a general testamentary power
over part of the corpus of a trust which he had created. After the
testator's death, his estate was duly administered and closed and
all federal taxes, including those relating to the trust property
subject to the power, were paid.
The widow thereafter died testate, leaving a will by which
she appointed part of the property in question to the plaintiff,
her daughter by a former marriage.9 2 As residuary legatee under
her mother's will, this daughter bore the burden of expenses and
taxes on her mother's estate9" and then cast about for some
way to shift the burden. Relying upon the rule that an appointee
is a beneficiary under the will of the donor of the power, 94 she
89342 Il. App. 352, 96 N. E. (2d) 634 (1950).
90 The case of In re Geatty's Estate, 408 Ill. 383, 97 N. E. (2d) 307 (1951), noted
in 29 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REvIEw 283 and 39 Ill. B. J. 518, dealing with the amount
of credit to be granted against an Illinois inheritance tax on local assets for estate
taxes imposed and debts incurred by the estate of a non-resident decedent, is discussed below under the heading of Taxation, particularly note 52.
"I direct that my said
91 Article 10th of the testator's second codicil read:
Executor shall pay out of the principal of my estate, any and all governmental
charges, taxes or liens imposed upon my estate, or the interests of any beneficiaries
under my Will and codicils thereto by any law of any state or country relating to
the transmission of property as the same are found to be payable . . . in the course
" Italics added.
of the administration of my estate..
92 While the validity of the appointment was not questioned, it does not appear
whether it was based upon a residuary gift or upon an express exercise of the
power.
93 In the absence of contrary evidence, the testator is presumed to have intended
that residuary gifts should abate in favor of general gifts: In re Eliopulos' Estate,
328 Ill. App. 389, 66 N. E. (2d) 183 (1946). See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1,
Ch. 3, § 447.
94 People v. Kaiser, 306 Ill. 313, 137 N. E. 826 (1923).
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sought to recover the taxes allocable to the property appointed
to her from the residuary legatee under the donor's will. A
decree dismissing her complaint was affirmed by the Appellate
Court. Granted that, as a matter of property law, the plaintiff
was a "beneficiary" under the donor's will, it was nevertheless
held that the taxes paid on the widow's, or donee's, estate were
not taxes paid "in the course of administration" of the donor's
estate. It was, therefore, held that the burden of the federal
estate tax should be left where the statute had placed it unless
the testator's intention to vary such incidence was made clear. 95
The decision seems sound, for while tax concepts frequently differ
from those of property law, a construction of the term "my
estate" from the tax lawyer's standpoint would seem to be
more nearly in accord with the testator's probable intent, inasmuch as taxes will be levied on that basis.
A question relating to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence
regarding a mistake in both a will and a trust was presented in
the case of Continental-Illinois Bank & Truest Company v. Art
96
Institute.
By the fourth article of his will, the testator gave
the remainder of his estate to a bank as trustee to add to and
administer as part of an amendable inter vivos trust. He made
reference therein to the trust agreement by date as well as to an
amendment thereto made in 1943, but omitted reference to certain
intervening trust amendments. In all, the trust agreement had
been amended seven times. One such amendment, made in 1934,
had substituted the Shriner's Hospitals and others as beneficiaries in lieu of the Art Institute. Two years later, the Art
Institute was reinstated as a beneficiary but no mention of that
fact was made in later amendments and codicils although specific
reference by date was made to six of the seven amendments.
The claims of the Shriner's Hospitals and the Art Institute
being inconsistent, the executor bank filed a complaint seeking
95 See, on that point, United States Trust Co. of New York v. Sears, 29 F. Supp.
643 (1939).
96341 Ill. App. 624, 94 N. E. (2d) 602 (1950). Subsequent to the period of this
survey, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the holding: 409 Ill. 481, 100 N. E. (2d)
625 (1951), noted in 40 Il1. B. J. 187. A further comment will appear in the March,
1952, issue of the CIIICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW.
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a construction of its duties under both the will and the trust
agreement. Extrinsic evidence of the mistaken omission was
received over objection and a decree was rendered giving effect to
the 1936 trust amendment. Two questions were raised on appeal
from that decree, to-wit: (1) whether the 1936 amendment was
expressly or impliedly revoked by the testator's failure to make
reference to it in the 1945 amendment, and (2) whether the 1936
amendment applied to property passing under the will as well as
to the original trust res. The Appellate Court for the First
District affirmed, holding, on the first issue, that the 1936 amendment to the trust was not revoked by the testator's failure, thereafter, to make reference to it.
On the second issue, the court decided that the trust instrument, with its several amendments, had become incorporated in
the 1943 will and the 1945 codicil thereto so as to apply to all
property of the testator. The omission of reference, in the later
codicil of 1945, to the 1936 amendment to the trust agreement was
held to be no more than an "error of description" for the correction of which the introduction of extrinsic evidence was permissible. The result is a surprising one, not so much because of a
revocable inter vivos trust was held to have been incorporated
into a will by reference 9 7 but because of the admission of parole
evidence to prove and explain what the testator may have intended
98
but what he had, in fact, omitted to say.
The right of an intended legatee or devisee, from whom a
gift had been diverted by the wrongful interference of a third
party, to sue for the damage caused thereby was presented in
the case of Lowe Foundation v. Northern Trust Company.9 9
It appeared there that plaintiff, a non-profit corporation, had been
97 The court did make note of the fact that there were no Illinois cases which had
passed on the point but also noted that the parties had not urged the question:
341 Ill. App. 624 at 635, 94 N. E. (2d) 602 at 608. It did, however, tacitly permit
the incorporation by reference to operate. According to Koeninger v. Toledo Trust
Co., 49 Ohio App. 490, 197 N. E. 419 (1934), an amendable trust agreement may be
properly incorporated as it stood at the date of the will, but that amendments made
thereafter, unless made in conformity with statutory requirements relating to wills,
could not be so incorporated.
98 On the subject of reformation, see James, Illinois Probate Law and Practice
(West Pub. Co., St. Paul, 1951), Vol. 1, § 43.52, p. 497.
99 342 Ill. App. 379, 96 N. E. (2d) 831 (1951).
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named as beneficiary of a substantial gift in the decedent's holographic will.' The defendant, who had been the testator's attorney, incorrectly stated to testator that a gift of that size would
exhaust the estate. As a consequence, the due execution of a will
making the same gift was prevented. The plaintiff sought to
recover the alleged intended legacy on either of three alternative
theories, to-wit: (1) by contesting probate on the ground of
undue influence, (2) by impressing the property with a constructive trust in favor of the plaintiff, and (3) by proving its injury
in a tort action against the attorney who had committed the alleged wrongful interference."
The Appellate Court for the First District disposed of the
first theory on the ground that the plaintiff had no "interest"
sufficient to entitle it to contest the probate inasmuch as it had
never been a legatee under any valid probated will of the testator.2 As to the availability of providing equitable relief in the
form of a constructive trust in favor of the intended legatee, a
new question in Illinois, the court was skeptical but did not express itself conclusively. It recognized that relief had been given
in cases where a devisee or legatee, by unlawful interference with
the making of a will, had diverted property to himself, but noted
statements to the effect that there had to be some intentional misconduct by the alleged trustee himself before any such relief
would be given. 3 It likewise avoided the necessity of deciding
whether the plaintiff had a cause of action in tort for the alleged
wrongful interference with the making of a will by finding the
absence of that scienter or reliance on which to base a claim of
1 Holographic wills, if not attested, are not valid in Illinois: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951,
Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 194.
2 Only an "interested person" may file a complaint to contest the validity of a
will: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 242. A legatee under a former will whose
interest has been diminished by a subsequent will has been said to be sufficiently
"interested" to contest probate, although not an heir at law of the decedent: Wilson
v. Bell, 315 Ill. App. 418, 43 N. E. (2d) 162 (1942).
3 See Ashton v. McQueen, 361 Ill. 132, 197 N. E. 561 (1935), citing Ryder v. Ryder,
244 Ill. 297, 91 N. E. 451 (1910). Neither case, however, involved a will. But see
Brennan v. Persselli, 353 Ill. 630 at 636, 187 N. E. 820 at 822 (1933), where the
court said that property obtained by one through the fraudulent practices of a
third person would be held under a constructive trust for the person defrauded
even though "the person receiving the benefit is innocent of collusion. If such person accepts the property, he adopts the means by which it was procured . . ."
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fraud. As meager authorities on the point are in conflict, 4 the
court's reticence would seem justified.
The troublesome point in the case relates to the use of constructive trust doctrines as a basis for relief where the intended
beneficiary has been deprived of an inheritance, in favor of another, through the fraud of a third party. Although that question
is apparently a new one in Illinois, it seems quite clear that a
court would give relief against one who, by his own wrong, obtained a gift which interfered with that intended for another.5
Reluctance to extend the rule to cover cases wherein the property
has been received by the wrongful misconduct of a third party
is sufficiently evident to make this remedy more doubtful. Despite
some authority to the contrary,6 however, the recent cases would
seem to favor the development of such a remedy 7 and, as refusal
to grant relief in the third-party fraud cases could lead to a circumvention of the orthodox constructive trust rule, it would seem
that Illinois would do well to grant that form of relief in a proper
case.
Attention should also be given to some cases relating to matters of probate administration and the like. In the case of In re
Estate of Balicki,s for example, the attesting witnesses testified
positively that the testator had not signed or acknowledged the
will in their presence. One of them also stated that no oppor4 Scott, Trusts, Vol. 3, § 489.4, p. 2371. Cases of this general type have been collection in an annotation in 11 A. L. R. (2d) 813.
5 In Ramsdel v. Moore, 153 Ind. 393, 53 N. E. 767 (1899), a husband who had dissuaded his wife from making a will in favor of the plaihtiff, upon a representation
that he would see to it that the plaintiffs obtained the property, was held as a
constructive trustee. The same principle was followed in Wrlla v. WrIla, 342 Ill.
31, 173 N. E. 768 (1930), a case concerning an inter vivos transaction wherein title
to real estate was obtained fraudulently.
6 In Dye v. Parker, 108 Kan. 304, 194 P. 640 (1921), rehearing denied 108 Kan.
305, 195 P. 599 (1921), the court refused to impose a constructive trust upon an
heir who had not been a party to the deceit. In Powell v. Yearance, 73 N. J. Eq.
117, 67 A. 892 (1907), one of two co-tenants promised, as devisee, to hold in trust
for another person. The court held that the constructive trust was to be imposed
only upon the share of the party making the fraudulent promise.
7 Bohannon v. Trotman, 214 N. C. 706, 200 S. E. 852 (1939) ; Pope v. Garrett, 147
Tex. 18, 211 S. W. (2d) 559 (1948), modifying 204 S. W. (2d) 867 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1947), noted in 37 Ky. L. Rev. 113 and 47 Mich. L. Rev. 598. See also Zimmerman v. Grolle, 38 Haw. 218 (1948), a case growing out of a mortgage foreclosure.
8408 Ill. 84, 96 N. E. (2d) 516 (1951), noted in 39 Ill. B. J. 378 and 40 Ill.
B. J. 183. The case, however, merely affirms the principle announced in Spangler
v. Bell, 390 Ill. 152, 60 N. E. (2d) 864 (1945).
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tunity had been given to read the attestation clause which contained a contrary recital. While the Supreme Court agreed that
an attestation clause constitutes prima facie evidence of due
execution,9 and that testimony of subscribing witnesses tending
to impeach a will should be received with caution, 1" it held the
attestation clause before it was not conclusive on the issue of due
execution and that evidence to impeach was there sufficient for
that purpose.
Another case, that of Eckland v. Jankowski," will serve to
clarify the effect of a judicial declaration of heirship. A predecessor in defendant's chain of title had been declared to be the
decedent's heir. 1 2 On the strength of that record, a series of
purchasers for value had dealt with the property. The subsequent discovery and probate of a will made by the decedent in
favor of the plaintiff, normally effective to transfer title,13 was
held inoperative to deprive the purchasers of their title as they
were said to have a right to rely upon the record as to heirship.
Although the problem might have been foreshadowed by an
earlier decision,'" the Supreme Court, in the matter of In re
Donovan's Estate," for the first time was faced with the precise
question as to whether acts done by an executor, while serving as
such subsequent to his election to renounce his spouse's will, could
serve to estop him from asserting his rights under the renunciation. The testatrix's husband had there accepted appointment as
a co-executor and, in the performance of this office, had joined
with the other co-exeocutors in the filing of an inventory. Shortly
thereafter, the spouse-executor filed his renunciation of the proBrelie v. Wilkie, 373 Ill. 409, 26 N. E. (2d) 475 (1940).
(2d) 625 (1937).
11407 "11.263, 95 N. E. (2d) 342 (1950), noted in 29 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVILV
265, 39 Ill. B. J. 294 and 412, and in 49 Mich. L. Rev. 1089.
12 Jurisdiction for that purpose is conferred by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3,
9

10 Szarat v. Schuerr, 365 Ill. 323, 6 N. E.

§ 209.
13 Ibid., Ch. 3, § 205.
14 In Kerner v. Peterson, 368 Ill. 59, 12 N. E. (2d) 884 (1938), it was held
a widow who had accepted office as executrix without bond and had acted in
capacity, as well as testamentary trustee, was not estopped to renounce her
band's will one day before the expiration of the time permitted by law for
purpose.
15409 III. 195, 98 N. E. (2d) 757 (1951).
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visions of the will intended for his benefit and elected to take his
statutory share. Notwithstanding this election, he continued to
work with the co-executors, joined in a conveyance of real estate,
filed a federal estate tax return and a fiduciary income tax return,
and did other acts needed in the administration of the estate, as
well as claimed and received compensation for his services as coexecutor. His co-executors, whose shares under the will would
be diminished by the renunciation, filed a partial report asking
for a declaration that the renunciation had thereby been waived
and that the spouse-executor should be estopped from asserting a
right to a statutory share in the estate. Although the probate
court sustained objections to this report, the circuit court, on
trial de novo, held in favor of the co-executors.
The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the circuit court and
affirmed the order of the probate court on the ground that none
of the husband's acts as executor, done subsequent to the filing
of his renunciation, operated to estop him from claiming his
rights according to law. Once the election had been made, it
operated as a complete bar to all of his rights as a legatee or
devisee under the will to the point where, except with court permission, he would not be permitted to retract.1" Such being the
case, the court felt it would not be possible for him to abandon his
election unintentionally. The decision seems to be completely
in accord with the purpose of the statutory provisions relating
to renunciation, that is, to permit the surviving spouse to take
in a manner most advantageous to him or her. 1 7 It also reinforces that purpose by permitting the spouse to implement the
choice by seeing to it that the estate is properly and effectively
administered.18
16 While filing of the renunciation needs no approval of the court, according to
Sippel v. Wolff, 333 Ill. 284, 164 N. E. 678 (1928), it may be withdrawn only if
filed under a mistake as to one's legal rights or as to the effect of the renunciation, and then only provided the rights of innocent third parties are not thereby
prejudiced: Hanson v. Clark, 236 Ill. App. 496 (1927).
17 See Golden v. Golden, 393 Ill. 536, 66 N. E. (2d) 662 (1946).
IsAlthough a renunciation is said to "obliterate" the provisions of the will made
for the spouse, It does not destroy other parts of the will: Sueske v. Schofield,
376 Ill. 431, 34 N. E. (2d) 399 (1941). Such being the case, it would seem as if
the clause designating an executor should stand, unless appointment, or continued
service, is thereby made conditional upon an absence of renunciation. It is true
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The principal legislative change in probate law, one relating
to the right of a surviving spouse to take dower, should operate to
render obsolete the rule of Bruce v. McCormick. 9 By the addition
of a new section to the Probate Act,20 a surviving spouse who
hereafter makes a conveyance of real estate, or of all interest
therein, prior to the time when the right to claim dower would be
barred, is thereby estopped from electing to take dower. As a
necessary corollary, other changes have been made in the statute
to make it clear that the surviving spouse is immediately vested
with an estate in fee simple, 21 to be divested only upon the taking
22
of prompt and proper steps to elect the lesser dower estate, and
is assured of a right to claim dower, if that is desired, in those
cases where the decedent left no descendants, parents or close
kin,23 thereby filling out what otherwise would have been an
incomplete pattern. The changes should prove a welcome and
beneficial addition to the law for they have added certainty and
stability to titles as well as provided the surviving spouse with
a more ready market for property.
Other changes had occurred in that personal representatives
are now authorized to file joint income tax returns with the
spouse of any decedent or ward ;24 the investment powers of
executors and administrators have been enlarged provided the
decedent has not made a contrary direction in the will, 2 5 a conservator or guardian need no longer provide bond to cover the
that one who serves as a witness to a will may not also claim to be an executor
thereunder by reason of his "interest" in the will: Jones v. Dreiser, 238 Ill. 183,
87 N. E. 295 (1909).
But the situation may be distinguished on the ground the
provisions barring a witness from taking as a beneficiary, Il. Rev. Stat. 1951,
Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 195, are designed to prevent overreaching.
19 396 Ill. 482, 72 N. E. (2d) 333 (1947), noted in 25 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
324. It was there held that a widow's quit-claim deed, executed before the right
to claim dower had been barred by lapse of time, was ineffective to pass title as it
was said that no title would vest in the widow until the possibility of taking
dower had, in fact, become barred.
20 Laws 1951, p. 974, H. B. 975; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 173a.
21 See James, Illinois Probate Law and Practice (West Pub. Co., St. Paul, 1951),
Vol. 1,§§ 11, 1&1, and 22.
22 Laws 1951, p. 974, H. B. 975. Modification has thereby been made in Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, §§ 162, 163, 166, 168, 170-3, 174-81, 189, 376 and 384.
23 Laws 1951, p. 974, 11. B. 975; Ili. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 162(4).
24 Laws 1951, p. 1862, S. B. 527; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 495a.
25 Laws 1951, p. 1634, I. B. 982; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 411a.
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value of timber or improvements on the ward's estate ;26 dram
shop actions have been added to the list of actions which survive ;27 public conservators and guardians, as well as public
administrators, may now be appointed in each county ;28 the statute relating to costs in veteran's proceedings has been enlarged ;29
and the sections relating to incompetents have been changed to
bring the terminology thereof into conformity with the Mental
Health Act.30
(To be continued)

26 Laws
27 Laws
28 Laws
29 Laws
30 Laws

1951,
1951,
1951,
1951,
1951,

p. 1239, H. B. 668; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 304.
p. 1680, H. B. 996; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 494.
p. 2056, S. B. 596; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, §§ 319-22.
p. 233, S. B. 408; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 270a.
p. 1530, H. B. 236; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, §§ 112 et seq.

